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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
... \T RICHMOND. 
Record No. 3122 
S. & L. STRAUS BEVERAGE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff in Error, 
versus 
COMl\IONvVE.ALTH OF VIRGINIA, Defendant in Error. 
PETITION FOR 'WRIT OF :FJRROR .AND BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT THEREOF. . 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virgin,ia: 
Your petitioner, S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation., a 
Virginia corporation, respectfully shows unto this Honor-
able Court tba t it is aggrieved by a final judgment of the 
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia, rendered 
on the 8th day of October, 1945, whereby the common-
2* wealth *of Virginia, plaintiff, obt~ined a judgment 
ag·ainst your petitioner in the sum of $649.04 with inter-
est thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from March 13, 1943, 
until paid, fo which order and judgment your petitioner, 
S. & L. Straus Bevemge Corporation, duly excepted, as ap-
pears from the final order entered therein (Tr., p. 10). 
For convenience, the parties will be referred to as plaintiff 
and defendant in accordance with the positions they occupied 
in the court below. it typewritten tra11script of the record, 
certified by the Trial tTudge, is hereto attached. All refer-
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ences to said transcript of the record will be by the use of 
the abbreviation "Tr." and will be to the paging of the Clerk 
of the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
PROCEEDINGS :BELOW. 
In.June, 1943, there was filed by the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia a notice of motion for judgment against the defendant 
in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. The plaintiff 
asked for a judgment against defendant for license taxes 
regularly assessed under Section 188 of the Tax Code of 
Virginia, and still unpaid, together with penalties. and inter-
est imposed by statute by reason o{ defendant's failure to 
pay the said taxes at the time prescribed by law. The total 
tax claimed by the plaintiff in its notice of motion amounted 
to $830.72, plus penalties and interest at 6%. The defendant 
admitted that the sum of $181.68 was due hy it and paid such 
sum to the plaintiff. The case came 011 to be heard upon the 
plaintiff's claim for the remaining $649.04, upon the facts · 
3* as stipulated, and the >,');exhibits filed. The lower court 
found in f.avor of the plaintiff and the final order said 
this: 
""Whereupon., the court having heard the facts as stipulated 
by the parties and the arguments of counsel, and having ma-
. turely considered of its judgment upon tho issues joined, doth 
a~udge and order that the said plaintiff do have judgment 
and recover of the said defendant the sum of $649.04 with 
interest thereon at the rate of 6 % per annum from March 13, 
1943, until paid.'' 
Defendant duly excepted· to the aforesaid order as being 
contrary to the law and evidence. 
'fhe question before the court involves the construction of 
the Revenue Laws of the State of Virginia and involves more 
than $300.00. 
THE FACTS~ 
The facts were stipulated and the exhibits were attached 
to the stipulation. The stipulation reads: 
''l. iS. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation, a Virginia cor-
poration, hereinafter called the defendant, is a wholesale 
merchant of wine and beer, with its place of bsuiness at 1107 
Summit Avenue, Richmond, Virginia. 
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'' 2. Defendant buys the beer which it sells from brewers 
(hereinafter ref erred to as manufacturers) only, some of 
which manufacturers are located hi Virginia and some with-
out Virginia. In reporting the amount of its pure.bases of 
beer for the years 1941 and 1942 for the purpose of securing , 
its wholesale merchant's license for the vcars 1942 and 1943 
pursuant to Section 188 of the Tax Code of Virginia and Sec- . 
tion 22(c) of Chapter 9·4 of th<~ Acts of Assembly ·of 1934, as 
amended by Acts 1940,, page 199, defendant did not include 
in such pure.bases the amount of the Virginia State excise· 
tax on the beer which has been previously paid by the manu-
facturers from wl1om the beer was purchased, which amount 
of excise tax was included in the remittances made bv de-
fendant to the manufacturers for the beer purchased ·from 
such manufacturers. For the vear 1941 the said exdse tax 
paid by manufacturers in Vir.ginia on the beer purchased 
· by defendant amounted to $79,593.71, and said tax paid by 
manufacturers without Virginia on the beer purchased by 
defendant amounted to $114,634.29, a total of $194,228.00. 
4* "For the year 1942 the corresponding amounts were $124,-
439.53 and $180,590.47, a total of $305,030.00. Copies of 
defendant's applications for wholesale merchant's licenses 
for the years 1942 and 1943 are attached hereto and made.a 
part hereof, identified as 'Exhibit A' and 'Exhibit B '. · 
'' 3. The invoice of the manufacturer for the beer pur-
chased by defendant shows the amount charged for the beer 
as one item and the amount of the- Virginia ~xcise tax previ-
ously paid by the manufacturer as another item, and in mak-
ing remittances to the manufacturer in payment of such in-
voice the defendant includes both items in one check; defend-
ant does not pay the tax shown on such invoices to the Com-
monwealth of Virginia. 'rypical invoices of manufacturers 
within and witllout Virginia are attached hereto and made a 
part hereof., identified as 'Exhibit C' and 'Exhibit D'. 
''4. A beer manufacturer from whom defendant purchases 
beer pays the State excise tax in the following manner: The 
beer manufacturer from time to time applies to the State Tax 
Commissioner for a tax release certificate covering· the de-
sired number of Virginia tax-paid crowns of the elass or 
classes needed, and accompanies such application by a certi-
fied check payable to the State Tax Commissioner for the 
amount of the Virginia excise tax the payment of which is 
evidenced by such crowns. Sur h tax release certificate is 
executed by ·the State Tax Commissioner and is directed and 
transmitted to au authorized and bonded crown manufacturer, 
who is under contract with the Commonwealth through the 
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State Tax Commissioner, and such crown manufacturer, on 
the authority of such tax release certificate, ships or delivers 
the Virginia tax-paid crowns to the beer manufactur~t who 
affixes them to the bottles of beer before they are shipped to 
the purchaser in Virginia. A duplicate. tax release certificate 
is sent by the State Tax Commissioner to the beer manufac-
turer which serves as his receipt for the tax paid. The beer 
manufacturer pays to the crown manufacturer the commercial 
value of such crowns as distinguished from their tax value. 
'• 5. On March 13, 1943, the State Department of Taxation 
in regular course of audit asse1Ased defendant with additional 
wholesale merchant's license tax for the years 1943 and 1942 
in the amounts of $396.54 and $:242.50, respectively, these as-
sessments being based upon the amounts of State excise taxes 
set out in the second paragraph which the manufacturers had 
paid on the beer pur·chased by defendant during the years 
1942 and 1941, which bad not been included by defendant in 
its purchases reported for the purpose of securing its whole-
sale merchant's licenses. 
"6. Defendant does not pay any State excise tax on beer 
directly to the Commonwealth of Virginia, such tax being 
paid as heretofore described, except that to one of the manu-. 
f~cturers located without· Virginia from whom it. purchases 
beer., defendant supplies Virginia tax-paid crowns, which 
means that as to the beer purchased from this manufacturer 
defendant does pay the tax direct to the State Tax 
5* *Commissioner; defendant makes approximately two per 
cent of its purchases of beer from this manufacturer. 
''7. It is agreed that the assessments described herein and 
covered by the notice of motion for judgment were validly 
made and correctly computed if under the law defendant 
should .have included in its purchases for the purpose of 
wholesale merchants' · license taxation the amount of excise 
tax paid by the manufacturers as hereinbef ore described.'' 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR. 
The trial court erred in entering judgment for the plaintiff 
in the snm of $649.04 with interest, such action being contrary-
to the law and contrary to and not supported by the evidence. 
STATUTES INVOLVED. 
Tax Code of Virginia, Section 188. Merchants-Wholesale. 
The provisions of this Section ,vhich are pertinent to this 
case, are: 
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"Every person, firm and corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of a wholesale merchant shall 1Jay a license tax for the 
privilege of doing business in this State to he measured by the 
amount of purchases made by him or it during the. next pre-
ceding year, and all goods, wares and merchandise manufac-
tured by such wholesale merchant and sold or offP.red for s'ale, 
in this State, as merchandise, shall be considered as purchases 
within the meaning of this section; provided, that this section 
shall not be construed as applying to manufacturers taxed on 
capital by this State, who offer for sale. at the place of manu-
facture, goods., wares and merchandise manufactured by 
them. 
* * • 
'' The word 'purchases,' as used in this section shall be con-
strued to include all goods, wares and merchandise received 
for sale at each definite place of business of every whole-
6* sale merchant. The word ,i;,, purchases,' as so used shall 
not be construed to exc1udo any goods, wares ~nd mer-
chandise otherwise coming within the meaning of the ::;aid 
word.*~* 
'' A manufacturer engaged in business in this State may; 
without a wholesale merchant's license, sell. at the place of 
manufacture, the goods, wares and merchandise manufac-
tured by him. If a manufacturer de.sires to gell, at a definite 
place or store, other than the place of manufacture, to other 
persons for resale., or to institutional, commercial or indus-
trial users, the goods, wares and merchandise manufactured 
by him, then such manufacturers must take out a wholesale 
merchant's license, though this definite place or store be lo-
cated in the same county, city or town in which his place of 
manufacture is established. "When a manufacturer estab-
lished a place or store for the sale of bis goods, other than 
at his place of manufacture, to otlwr persons for resale, or to 
institutional, commercial or indm;trial useis, the amount of 
the State license tax is to be mea~ured not onlv bv the amount 
of purclrnses made by such manufacturer f~oni others, but 
also by the goods, wares nnd merchandise manufactured by 
him and sent from the place of manufacture to his store for 
sale; * * * The cost of manufacture shall be taken as the pm·-
chase price of the good~., wares and merehandise in the case 
of a manufacturer who is ah,o a wholesale merchant within 
tl1e meaning of the law.'' 
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In the Virginia Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, Section 
4675 (27) (b) an excise tax is imposed as follows: 
''There is hereby levied on all b~er bottled in Virginia and 
on _all beer sold in Virginia, an excise tax at the rate of two 
dollars and seventy-five cents per barrel of thirty-one gallons, 
and a tax at the same rate on such beer in containers of more 
or less than thirty-one gallons, but on such beer in bottles of 
not more than twelve ounces each the tax shall be one cent 
per bottle; • * * The tax lierein levied shall be paid by the re-
spective bottlers and wholesalers of the said beer, if not pre-
viously paid. No such tax shall be collected upon any beer 
bottled or sold in Virginia when the State excise tax provided 
for in this act shall have been previously levied, and paid 
thereon in full; but if on beer bottled in Virginia there shall 
have been paid by the manufacturer the excise herein levied, 
such bottler shall pay all additional excise taxes which may 
be due on such beer in bottled form." 
7* •Asimilar excise tax is imposed on the manufacture of 
beer under certain circumstances as shown by Section 
4675 (27) (a) : 
'' There is hereby levied on all beer manufactured in Vir-
ginia an excise tax at the rate of two dollars and seventy-five 
cents per barrel of thirty-one gallons, and a tax at the same 
rate on such beer in containers of more or less than thirty-one 
g·allons, but on such beer in bottleR of not more than twelve 
ounces each the tax shall be one cent per bottle; *" * * Such tax 
shall be paid by the person who manufactures the said beer.'' . 
As to the method and manner of evidencing the payment 
of the excise tax by the m~nufacturer,.Section 4675 (28) pro-
vides in part as fallows: 
'' Except as may be otherwise providPd herein, each man~-
facturer or bottler of beer in this State shall, within twenty-
four ( 24) hours after the beer is placed in an original con-
tainer or bottles., ancl prior to delivery of any· container of 
beer to any wholesaler, jobber, retaileJ·, distributor, or any 
other person whatsoever in this State, affix the proper stamp, 
crown, or lid to each containe1· and wherever a stamp is used, 
cancel the stamp ·so affixed by writing or stamping across the 
face thereof the name of such manufacturer or bottler and the 
date of such cancellation.'' 
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POSITION OF THE DEFENDANT, S. & L. STRAUS 
BEVERAGE CORPORATION. 
The defendant contends: 
1. Under Section 188 of the Tax Code, by virtue of which it 
must pay a wholesale merchant's license tax, tlle '' amount of 
· purchases'' means the total amount paid hy defendant to the 
manufacturers of beer and wine for the beer and wine pur-
chased and that such wordR clo not in any way contemplate 
the inclusion of any excise tax which may be levied by and 
paid to the State of Virginia on such beer and wine prior to 
their sale in Virginia. 
8* *2. To include excise taxes paid to the State· of Vir-
ginia in the "amount of purchases" on which its whole-
sale merchant's license tax is to be measured, would consti-
tute double taxation and that the General Assembly not hav-
ing expressed its intention, by clear and unequivocal lan-
guage., to levy such double taxation, no such construction 
should be given to the section. 
3. Under Section 188 manufacturers in Virginia, who also 
operate as wholesale merchants at locations other than the 
place of manufacture, are not required by the section to in-
clude excise taxes paid by them on their manufactured prod-
ucts as a part of the '' amount of purchases'' on which their 
wholesale license taxes are to be based and that if the Section 
is construed so as to have excise taxes included in the '' amount 
of purchases" on which all other wholesale merchants' li-
cense taxes are measured, surh construction would violate 
the rule that there must be equality and uniformity in the 
operation of a tax on all persons within the same class. 
ARGUMENT. 
1. 
Rule of C onstr-nction. 
It must be remembered that we are dealing with a tax stat-. 
ute. The rule has long been established in Virginia that such 
statutes are not to be construed libera11y, but are to be con-
strued strictly and their provisions are not to be extended by 
implication beyond the clear import of the language used. In 
any case of ambiguity or doubt the construction must be 
against the government and in favor of the public. 
• 
• 
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2. 
Construction of Section. 188 of the Tax Code. 
The wording of the Act does not lend itself fa? the con-
9* struction *that an excise tax must be included in the 
''amount of purchases''. 
The statute says: 
"Eve~y person, firm and corporation engaged in the busi-
ness of a wholesale merchant shall pay a license tax for the 
privilege of doing business in this State to be measured by 
the amount of pmchases made by him or it during the next 
preceding year * * *. '' 
And further on: 
'' The word 'purchases' as used in this section, shall be con-
strued to inc.lude all goods, wares and merchandise received 
for sale at each definite place of business of every wholesale 
merchant.'' 
In this case the defendant accomplished its purchases in 
· three different ways : 
1. On a part of its business it paid to the State of Virginia 
the excise tax provided in Section 4675 (27) and received in 
evidence of such payment the "crowns'' for the beer which it 
was purchasing. These crowns were sent to the manufac-
turer and the .manufacturer in turn shipped tl1e beer to the 
defendant and included on its iuvoire no reference to the 
excise tax . 
2. The defendant purchased a part of its beer and wine 
from manufacturers outside of Virginia which manufacturers 
had paid to the State of Virginia the excise. tax in question. 
In such instances the manufacturer would bill the defendant 
for the cost of the beer and ·wine and would add a separate 
and distinct item covering the excise tax paid by the manu-
.facturer. The defendant would pay for the beer and wine so 
purchased and would add to its check an amount sufficient to 
reimburse the manufacturer for the excise tax paid. 
10* *3. The remaining part of the defendant's business 
was l1andled by purchases from manufacturers of beer 
and wine in the State of Virginia, which manufacturers, prior 
to the sale of the beer and wine to the defendant, had paid the 
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excise tax to the State of Virgfoia. In this instance, also, the 
invoice from the manufacturer would show the cost or pur-
chase price of the beer and wine pnrr.hased and would have 
on it a separate and distinct ifom showing the amount of ex-
cise tax paid. The check sent by the def enclant to the manu-
facturer would be for the purchase price of the beer and to the 
check would be added an amount sufficient to reimburse the 
manufacturer for the excise tax paid. 
In method No. 1 it is obvious that the excise tax paid di-
rectly to the State of Virginia by the defendant should not 
have been included in -the '' amount of purchases'' to be used 
as a measure for the license tax. 
We think that it is equally obvious that tbe amount of ex-
cise taxes should not be included in the '' amount of pur-
chases'' in method No. -2. The invoices in method No. 2 
showed .distinct!)• the price of the beer and wine and then 
contained another item showing the amount of the excise tax. 
The excise tax was not '' buried in the price'' of the beer and 
wine. In each shipment the excise tax was listed separately 
and the defendant put the manufacturer in funds to reim-
burse it for the payment of that tax. A.ctually the.re was no 
obligation on any of the manufacturer~ in method No. 2 to 
pay the excise tax. The tax created by Section 4675 (27) of 
the Virginia Code could not be extended to manufacturers 
outside of Virginia. The General Assembly recognized such 
fact when it said in 4675 (27) (b) tliat such excise tax 
11 * should be paid *by the wholesalers and bottler's in Vir-
ginia, "·if not vrev'iously paid''. Clearly, in this in-
stance, therefore, the manufacturer was paying the excise 
tax voluntarily and as a matter of eonvenience, knowing full 
well that the purchasers in Virginia, including· the defendant, 
of its wares would put it in funds for the payment of such 
tax. 
The same situation exists in method No. 3 as in method 
No. 2 except that there is an obligation on the manufac-
t~rer in Vh:ginia to pay the excise tax after the manufacture 
of the beer and wine and prior to the sale thereof to the wl10le-
saler. Here, as in method No. 2, the invoices distinctly 
showed the price of the beer and wine and then had a sepa-
rate and distinct item covering the amount of excise taxes 
paid by the manufacturer. There was no difference in tbe 
manner of payment by the clef encfant of the invoices in method 
No. 2, and the payment by it of invoicei:; in method No. 3. 
"Purchases", under the statutory definition above, are for 
the "goods, wares and mercl:mndise", which., in this case, were 
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beer and wine. It is submitted that such definition cannot be· 
extended to include excise taxes. 
One cannot ''purchase'' an exc-ise tax. He can purchase 
the evidence of its payment :-For example, in this case, beer 
''crowns'' can be purchased as evi.d(mee of payment of the 
exeise tax. Also a person can pay the· excise tax either di-
rectly or indirectly by reimbursing the person who has paid 
it directly:-but he cannot ''purchase" t)le tax. 
12* *If the framers of the section had intended excise 
taxes to be added to the purchase price of the goods, 
wares ·aud merchandise, it would have been very simple for 
them to have added to the definition of ·the word "purchases" 
the words '' plus any and all excise taxes paid or to be paid to 
the State of Virginia on such goods, wares and merchan-
dise.'' Evidently the framers did not wish to add such words 
and it is submitted that this court should not. 
3. 
Double Taxation. 
If the amount of the excise taxes paid· to the State of Vir-
ginia should have been added to the '' am.ount of purchases'' 
in order to measure the size of the defendant's wholesale 
license tax, such action would have constituted double taxa-
tion, in that the defendant would have been paying a license 
tax on e
1
xcise taxes paid either directly or indirectly by it to 
the State of Virginia. The defendant does not contend that 
the General Assembly would not have bad authority to levy 
such a tax even though it should constitute double taxation. 
The .defendant does contend, however, that the intention of 
the General Assembly to levy such double tax must be shown 
by clear and unequivocal language and that Section 188 falls 
far short of containing any language expressing such intent. 
4. 
Discrimination. 
As will be noted above there is a provision in Section 
13* 188 of the *Tax Code which requires Virginia manufac-
turers to pay the same wholesale license tax; when sell-
ing its manufactured products wholesale at a place of busi-
ness other than the place of manufacture, as is paid by other 
wholesale merchants. Obviously, however, the manufacturer, 
who operates as a wholesaler, docs not "purchase" his own 
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goods from himself. Accordingly the statute has added a 
definition of "purchase price" applicable in such cases. It 
says: 
'' The cost of manufacture shall be taken as the purchase 
price of the goods, wares and merchandise in the case of a 
manufacturer who is also a wholesale merchant within the 
meaning of the law.'' · 
Under no circumstances can the excise tax levied under 
Section 4675 (27) be considered a "cost of manufacture". 
We believe that the Tax Commissioner of the State of Vir-
ginia will concede such a position and we do not believe that 
the attorneys for the Commonwealth will deny its correct-
ness. 
Even if counsel for tile Commonwealth will not admit that 
the excise taxes are not a part of the cost of manufacture, we 
believe that the accuracy of such statement will be apparent 
to this court. The excise tax is placed on goods which have 
been manufactured. Tl1ere is no excise tax until after the 
goods are manufactured. Section 4675 (:28) above quoted, 
dealing with the method and manner of payment of the ex-
cise tax, conclusively supports this position. It says that 
'3ach manufacturer or bottler of beer in the State shall ''with-
.in twenty-four hours after the beer is placed in an ori!,>inal 
container.or bottles'' atli"'{ the proper stamp or crown showing 
payment of the tax. Obviously, from this wording, and 
14* as well as from the *nature of the tax, the tax is not 
imposed until after the beer is brewed or manufactured. 
Assuming that the excise tax should not properly be listed 
, as a part of the cost of manufacture, tlJe result is that a manu-
facturer acting as a wholesale merchant under this Act and 
selling his own produce would hav~ to pay a license tax meas-
ured by the cost of the product w1,thou.t any reference to the 
excise tax. On the other hand if the construction sought by 
the Commonwealth on Section 188 prevails, the defendant, 
who is also a wholesale merchant, and who mig·ht sell beer 
from the manufacturer just mentioned, would have to pav a 
license tax measured not onlv bv the amount of the cost of "'the 
beer to him, but also by the amount of the excise tax. It is 
obvious that the framers of the section intended to place a 
manufacturer who also sells at wholesale, at a place other 
than the place of manufacture, in the same rlass as the other 
wholesale merchants in the State. Being- in the same class 
the Tax Statute should operate alike on both the wholesaler 
who is a manufacturer and the wholesaler who is not a manu-
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facturer. To construe the section otherwise would be to 
violate the rule against discrimination between taxable sub-
jects which properly belong· to the. same class. 
If such a situation existed, it would probably render the 
license tax invalid. We do not believe, however, that the 
framers of the section intended any such discrimination and 
for that further reason we submit that any construction of 
· the section which would require the defendant to include in 
its "amount of purchases" exci~e taxes paid to Virginia is 
a wrongful construction of . the words of the section and of 
the intent of the framers. 
=itThcre is an additional situation which would result 
15* in discrimination against persons in the same class if 
the Commonwealth's contention that the excise taxes 
constitute a part of the ''amount of purchases'' is sustained. 
vVc believe. that the attorneys for the Commonwealth will 
concede that if a wholesaler purchased all of its beer from 
out-of-state manufacturers and no excise taxes were paid by 
those manufacturers, hut were paid by the wholesaler to the 
State direct after receipt of the beer from the manufacturers, 
the excise taxes would not constitute any part of the '' amount 
of purchases''. Under such circumstances suppose the whole-
saler purchased $1,000,000.00 worth of beer from out-of-state 
manufacturers and after its receipt paid to the State $200,-
000.00 in excise taxes. The wholesaler would then pay a 
wholesale merc.hant 's license tax measured only by the 
tl,000,000.00 purchases from the out-of-state manufacturers. 
Suppose, however, that another wholesaler in exactly the 
same class as the first purchased all. of its beer from manu-
facturers outside of Virginia who had decided to pay the, 
excise taxes before shipping· the beer to Virginia and to ob-
tain reimbursernent for taxes from the wholesaler. Accord-
ing to the Commonwealth's contention that wholesaler, if he 
bought $1,000,000.00 worth of beer from outside manufac-
turers who had paid $200,000.00 in excise taxes would have 
to pay a license tax on $1,200,000.00 in '' amount of pur~ 
chases'' instead of $1,000,000.00 in '' amount of purchases''. 
And yet the two wholesalers would be doing exactly the same 
amount of' business and might even be selling the same brand 
of beer. Obviously there would be a discrimination against 
the latter wholesaler. It is respectfully submitted that 
16* the General Assembly had no *intent to and did not 
promulg·ate a statute under which such condition could 
arise. 
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AUTHORITIES. 
1. 
Rule of Oo;istruction. 
The rule that a Tax Statute must be construed strictly and 
that where there is any doubt as to its meaning it must be 
construed most strongly ag·ainst the government and liber-
ally in favor of the public, is so well established in Virginia 
that it is not thought necessary to cite the various cases which 
support it. One of the first and leading cases is Combined 
Saw an(l Planer Company v. Flournoy, 88 Va. 1029, in which 
Mr. Justice Fauntleroy, in delivering the opinion of the 
court, said in part: 
'' 'Statutes levying duties or taxes upon subjects or citi-
.zens are to be construed most strongly against the govern-
ment, and in favor of their subjects or citizens, and their 
provisions are not to be extended, by implication, beyond the 
clear import of the languag·e used. Revenue laws are neither 
remedial statutes nor laws founded upon any permanent pub..: 
lie policy, and are not therefore to be liberally construed. 
·Hence, whenever there is a just doubt, that doubt should ab-
solve the taxpayer from his burden.' Mayor of Savannah v. 
Hartridge, 8 Georgia 30. · 
" 'I do not think that a strained construction is allowable 
of an act which levies money from the citizens. The amount 
of the levy, the subject. of it, and the method of raising it 
ought to be so plainly pointed out, as to avoid all danger of 
oppression by an erroneous interpretation; and where there 
is a fair doubt, the citizen should have the advantage of it.' 
State v. Bank of N ewbitrn, 1 Devereux & Battles, 218. 
17* *'' 'It is a well settled rule of law that every charge 
upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unam-
bigous language. Acts of Parliament which impose a duty 
upon the public, will be critically construed with reference to 
the particular language in which they are expressed. When 
there is any ambiguity found, the construction must be in fa-
vor of the public, because it is a general rule that when the 
public are to be charged with a burden, the intention of the 
legislature to impose that burden must be explicitly and dis-
tinctly shown.' Dwarris on Statutes, 255-789, Ed. 1885. 'In 
14 
"•' '. •. ~, ( . . . •. ( t" \ .. ' . , • • ' ' ' • I• s~pr~irie bou~t of .i\.ppea1s or vi~giiiia 
the reve1~ue laws whep~. ~l~u.~~s.fµQi~tjpg paips and .Pe~alti~s 
· are amb1guously or obscurely worded, the mterpretation 1s 
ever in favor of the subject, for the plain reason that the leg-· 
islature is ever at hand and explains its own meaning, and 
to express more clel1rl~11 iw43it h~s. peen obscurely expressed.' 
Dwarris on Sta t.utes, 251, Ed. 1885.'' 
2. 
1 J " .... j' • , f ••I • , ,., :- J. • ! •, ! 1 ' • , / ' ' l 1 , 
Construction of Section 188 of the Tax Code. 
, :OoAAiei._r~.~jh~ !a~iiii4a~t fi1~:Y~. be~n :1111~~1~ tc~, ~~4 ~riy 
Y~r8-i~ifl .c~~e. on t:q~ .c~1iwtr~~t~~1,1 pf. ~ect,1.qn; ~~- 9.f 1 the-{fa.; 
pod~ wWyh, 4e.~ls ~~itll1 t4~ ~~~ct pp1~1t1 q9Jo.:r~ _t]?.e ,~9.µi;t. T~ere 
1s an ana1og·ous situation on which this c9~t. pas~_e4, )1_aw-
ever, in the opinion of which we believe a necessary inf er-
ep~,e exlst~ ,y~icl;i, sµpJ?.~,·~~' t:\1e :,dPtwJ.dant's. pos~tiqu_ in this 
c.a,~(31.,,, .It. i~ $pr4fli~'f'17, I !3;i~,(!1:£it 9,Q'Y,!!,J)Cf'fnJ ,V, ."J;;.~oy~, ~ 7 4 v;~ .. ~9.~. 
$p~t11i~;rl1: ~~~~~~~. po~p{li;tY ~purcpAs~d.~ ~ C<?llW.~~raqle .a~qu;n~ 
9! flcn~r. ~r~m.;:pµ:nlop.,M.~11~. :·. JAoyd :}~ra~. appqjnted r~~et~er 
fqr :Q.µulo.R ll~gs~ . ~i;t .. the. ,price, ,{!;l.l~rg~cJ, ~o:iit1i_ecyi _Bis~~it 
Qq1np~~Y. _9y, P,un}op_._MiAs f p~ th~ .. ~o~r, :0µ.:µJop Mrns in~\~deµ 
FP:~.-pi;9.~~ss,ing. t;n,; w4ic~ h~d.,p,ee11. hppo~ed Qy,_._the .Jre~e\·~l 
G9~<tr:rJ.Jll~u~ .. It ~it;(11qt ~r;uregµte Ni~~ ~a.x or re1t4fJt: .any s~a~~~ 
mqrif, f.f~ _tq. f he. q1n,wnt tl~~_re9Jt, }t !:ii»w}y ~t~te4. jn t)Je, co;n,-
tract of sale that the price named ~per.~\:µ Jn._(.\\u~eq. ,alJ I ta~e~ 
including the processing taxes. The processing tax statute 
,, . WP.-~ ~rqp~~qv~µ~ly. df!_Cll:l~~q. ~nv.~li;d aµd D~nl9p Mills 
18* ~.u~« for 1~. ;r.eq~v~r)~ of ~11 p1~9_c.e~si~g._ t3i~e.~ .. p~iµ to. th~ 
. . Jr~derial, A~v:e:rnw~nt. A. ;r;eGov~ry ,,y.3:s ::ma9e by LlPY.d, 
!eC#};Y~r. .for; Du,nlQp :M:iils~ Scmt];t~rn BAscmit ,C.ompapy, ,theµ 
fl: tt~mp~~q. t9 , ~:~coxtW .. fl'o;ip; .PPY4, _rec~tve;r;,. th~ a;t1J:o:unt o.f 
m·.oc,€js~~ng t~~~s il:~co:WW~~ .l?Y ll:i:m O;J.! t~e fl.our. ~Qld· .to .. it; Q.ll 
the theoly; t,1.at. ~b;~ .tax~~ ~ha4. \been pqr,1):e _by., .t)l~ Souther;i;i 
Biscuit Company and that they were not properly a part of 
the;,p;t;ircp:~s~ pri~e. ot t~e ~~:rµr-: , Tµ~ _9_011rt <;l~nied Souther;n 
Bi_squit -_Oo~p~~y'~ 1Gl~.i.w Qn.Jh~ ,gi;oµ~q. t4at Jh,e .~~x had 
be~n ~ 'lp~r,i~d)11. th~- pi;i~e.' ~ -~µd ~hat und~r th~. contract there 
}ya_s .~ s~ng~e,,ovei·t1ll. pr~~e. pe-:r: .. ~n~t .. of good.f?, .th~.t.ii;;,. for each 
parrel c;>,f tiom·-:-::th.aJ th~.r~ .4~4 .. b({~n :lW ~eg_reg.~tiQn .of th~ 
t_a~, at. p.1e ~iµ1e. oi. th;e P.~rch~~9 by S~:mthern. Bi ~~u.it .Cornpany 
flP.d._ that th~ oy~~·all, pvr~h~s~ price. iW.~s. to .. be paid jn a11y 
eve~~-,: :T:4t&. coµ,rt .r~.c.og~iz,~~ .. the !.diff~_re;n.Q~ P.etw~e:p. .th~t 
~a~e, .~~d tpo~e cas_e~ .~4~:rq. ~. ,t~x paq., b.~e.:o.. ~~gregatQd. from 
pie p;r~ce, ot ~he good~. ~Ad lwd_ b~en._cql_lect~d f1:om the buyer 
by the seller. . We think, by necessary inference, that this 
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court approved the doctrine enunciated in this latter class 
of cases. Mr. Justice Spratley, in rendering the opinion of 
the court, said in part : 
"This is not a case of the buyer putting the seller in funds 
to pay a tax; but it is a case in whi0h the tax is a part of a 
composite price to be paid for the product in any event. The 
stipulation shows that here there was only a single stated 
price,-the price per unit of goods-that is, a barrel of flour. 
That price included the processing tax as was 1·ecited in the 
contract. There was no segregation of the tax nor any state~ 
ment of the amount of it. 
"In O'Comior-Bil'ls, Inc., v. WashbU,rn Crosby Co., supra; 
Johnson v. Scott County 111-illing Co., supra; G. S. J ohnBO·ni 
Co. v. N. Sauer Milling Co., sitpra; and Golding Bros. Co., 
frbc., v. Duniaine, supra, the courts, in each instance, held that 
the taxes were included as a part of the price of the flour and, 
the ref ore, were 'buried in the price'. 
''In the 1934 form of contract, it is stated: 'The price 
19"" *named in this contract includes all taxes.' In the 1935 
contract, we find the following: 'The price · named in 
this contract includes the processing taxes.' 
'' The appellant, in support of its contention that this is a 
case where the buyer bas put the seller in funds with which 
to pay a tax, cites a number of cases, including Wayne Coimty 
Produce Co. v. Du,ff'y-Mott Co., Inc., 244 N. Y. 351, 155 N. E. 
669; Kerber S'trG.IW Hat Corp. v. Lincoln, et al., 266 N. Y. 410, 
195 N. JiJ. 130; and Brown v. Salter, 59 Ga. App. 579, 1 S. E. 
(2d) 468. In none of these cases was the item of the tax in-
cluded in the composite price to be paid for the product. In 
each of these cases there was an agTeement between the par-
ties with reference to the tax, which agTeement was separate 
and apart from the contract price of the goods sold. 
"In Wayne County Prodzwe Co. v. Duff'y:..Mott Co., Inc., 
supra, the court recognized the distinction between a. situa-
tion where the buyer puts the seller in funds to pay a tax 
and where the tax is 'buried in the price'. That court said: 
'' 'This is not a case where the item of the tax is absorbed 
in a total or composite price to be paid at all events. In 
such a case the buyer is without remedy, though the annul-
ment of the tax may increase the profit to the seller. Moore 
v. Des .A.rts, 1 N. Y. 359. This is a case where the promise of 
• 
• 
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the' buyer is to pay a stated price, . and to put the seller in 
funds for the payment of a tax besides " * • . ' '' 
It is respectfully submitted that the situations are anaJo-
gous and that the reasoning followed in the Wayne Cownty 
Produce Oonipany v. Duffy-Mott Company, Incorporated, re-
ferred to by Judge Spratley, applies to the case now before 
this court. It is also submitted that the excise tax mentioned 
on each of the invoices received and paid by the defendant 
was not a tax which was "buried in the price" and should 
not, therefore, be considered as a part of the '' amount of 
purchases''. 
There are some cases in other jurisdictions which throw 
light on what constitutes the "purchase price" or 
20* '' amount of purchase'' in similar *statutes .. 
In Bloxom v. Ilenneford, 193 Wash. 540, 76 Pac. (2) 
586, it was held that the purchase price of a commodity did 
not include the cost of transportation and, inferentially, that 
it did not include custom duties paid on the goods shipped 
from Mexico to Washington. In that particular case the 
State statute involved read in part as follows: 
"Section 8, c. 180, p. 716, Laws 1935, p1·ovides that persons 
eng·aged in business as distributors of ag·ricultural products 
-brokers in agricultural products or produce jobbers-shall 
pay, for the act or privilege of engaging in such business ac-
tivity, a tax which 'shall be equal to the gross earning upon 
such sales multiplied by the rate of one-half of one per cent, 
the intent hereof being that tax measured by gross proceeds 
of sales shall be imposed only with respect to persons mak-
ing the last of ·a succession of wholesale sales of such prod-
ucts. The term ''gross earnings", as used in this section, 
shall mean the gross proceeds of sales less the amount of 
the purchase price paid for the products herein mentioned'. 
"The term 'gross proceeds of sales' is defined as follows 
in sub-division (f), Section 5, c. 180, p. 711, La~s 1935: '(f) 
The term '' gross proceeds of sales'' means the value proceed-
ing or accruing from the sale of tangible personal property 
without any deduction on account of the cost of property 
sold, the cost of materials used, labor costs, interest, dis-
cou~t paid, delivery costs, taxes or any other expense what-
soever paid or accrued and without any deduction on account 
of losses.' '' 
The seller or broker claimed as a part of the purchase 
price, and included in the deduction from gross sales, the 
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cost of transportation. It was held that such transportation 
charges did not constitute a part of the purchase price and 
the deduction was not allowed. The opinion of the court in 
part is as follows : 
· '' The purchase price, as that phrase is employed in the 
definHion of g·ross earnings in section 8, c. 180, p. 716, Laws 
1935, means the purchase price paid by the jobber to 
_21 • the person *from whom he bought the goods. The cost 
of transportation to the purchaser's place of business, 
whether freig·ht, drayage, or other costs paid by the pur-
~haser after he bought the goods, cannot, without doing vio-
lence to the language of the statute, be included within the 
phrase 'purchase price '. 
"* * * The costs or charges paid by· the jobber to the rail-
road company or to the refrig·erator car company do not 
come within any fair definition of the phrase 'purchase 
price'.'' 
In the Bloxom case just cited the State contended that the 
transportation.charges were not a part of the purchase price. 
The result of the court's decision in sustaining the State's 
position was to increase the amount of collectible taxes. The 
reverse of the situation existed in Whitehill Sand and Gravel 
Oornpany v. State Tax Com1nissioner (Utah), 150 Pac. (2) 
370, where the State contended that the transportation charges 
were a part of the purchase price·. The statute in this case 
provided in part: 
'' Sec. 80-15-4, supra, reads as follows : 'From and after 
the effective date of this act there is levied and there shall be 
collected and paid : · 
'' ' (a) A. tax upon every retail sale of tangible personal 
property made within the State of Utah, equivalent to two 
per cent of the purchase price paid or charged, * * * . ' '' 
The plaintiff was eng·aged in the business of $elling sand 
and gravel. He contended that his sales were made at the 
gravel pit. In some instances he charged the buyer for the. 
hauling, but he contended that the hauling was done by inde-
pendent contractors. In those instances where the plaintiff 
· charg·ed his customers for hauling he did not segregate on 
the invoice the hauling cost from the cost of the gravel. It 
was shown, however, that such segregation was made on the 
18 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
books of the plaintiff. The Tnx Commissioner included the 
transportation charges as a part of the sales price, and 
22* *collected a sales tax thereon. The plaintiff brought 
action for recovery of the taxes on the amount paid for 
hauling and the court directed recovery under certain con-
ditions and held that such transportation charges were no 
part of the sales price. 
In Standard Oil Conipany v. State, 283 Mich. 85, 276 N. W. 
908, the plaintiff brought an action to recover sales taxes paid 
by it to the State of Michigan on that part of its '' gross pro-
ceeds'' consisting of Federal excise taxes on gasoline and 
lubricating oils paid by it to the Federal Government. The 
court referred to the applicable statute as follows: 
''The assessment was made upon the theory that the ex-
cise exacted by the General Sales Tax Act is an annual 'tax 
imposed upon the privilege of making retail sales, measured 
by the gross proceeds of such sales, less deductions allowed 
by statute'; that under the above act, section 1 (b.1), the 
term 'sale at retail' means: 'any transaction by which is 
transferred for consideration the ownership of tangible per-
sonal property'; that 'gross proceeds' means: 'the amount 
received in money, credits, property or other money's worth 
in consideration of sales at retail within this state, without 
any deduction on account of the cost of· the property sold, 
the cost of materials used; the cost of labor or services pur-
chased, amounts paid for interest or discounts, or any other 
expenses whatsoever, nor shall any deduction be allowed for 
losses. Credits or refunds for returned goods may be de-
ducted.' Act No. 167, Pub. Acts 1933, Sec. 1 ( c). '' 
In holding that the Federal excise taxes on gasolipe and 
lubricating oils paid by the plaintiff and by it collected from 
its customers, were not a part of the '' gross proceeds'' and 
were not subject to the State sales tax, the Michigan court 
said in part as follows: 
"V{e now come to the following question: Is it lawful for 
defendants to assess the sales tax on the amount paid to the· 
United States Government as· federal excise tax collected on 
retail sales of gasoline and lubricating oil, in the case of 
23* *retail sales direct from producer to consumer? 
"It is the claim of plaintiff that, in the case of retail 
sales made direct from producer to consumer, the amount of 
s. & t. stfa~~ i3~~e;kg·e borp. v. c~~riighwea1th 1§ 
!~.~ ,r~4erit ~;~.i~~ t~~ ~» gi~Riiu~, .~~a i~i:iqfli.liig 9~, is ~~ 
part of the re:t~~l s.fl.l~ ,pr~pe,. 1oi:,,jg,rqs~hpp~c~e4s.~· .. tlit¥-'~O~. ~t 
the time the state sales tax attaches; t at the federal excise 
ff/,~~~ ·fl:,SH;l~~ l~a~ ~t~elt-,7"~q~ ~ ,tp.x. Pl}, 1¥~1iwfqptur~~-fl:gµ q~es 
no~"attp.~h .u;ntiJ il~e. in~tfil\tiJJi~. 1 ~al~ 1s11m~¢l-A ;_ t~at .. th.~ .. ~tat~ 
sales tax attaches at t1ie same mstant, namely, upon consum-
mation of the last sale prior to use or consumption (Michi-
gan Sales Tax Regulations of ,.January 1, 1934), with the re-
.suit that, when the state sales tax attaches, the federal tax 
is not a part of the priGe of the iµerchandise; and that the 
inclusion of the federal tax as a part of the price of 'gross 
proceeds' of the sale and imposition of the State sales tax 
thereon fa,. w.ithout. questioR,. a ta:x:. on. a. tflx. · ) . . . . . . _ 
, .. "·The .. defendants. con~nq tliat; in .the retail.sale of. products 
sold by plaintiff, .the federaJ .. e~cise .tax becomes. a par.t. of the 
sale price, and a sales tax computed upon the gross proceeds, 
in~l~din~ ,i;;µ~h. exci~e U1;{, ~s. euti:i:~.ly l.a;wfo~. qpd IffOp~r.;.,that 
th.e ~~a~t~~m ,Qf. t4~ .. }){iQh~gfl:n. ~a,le.$it_µ~ .. cJo~s. u~t j,~pQ~e. ~ 
qµr.den upon the effectual exercise of a federal governmental 
power. 
* * 
l . • ..• ' ... ' • • i • • • • • l ' i ' '... t • - j I ' • ' •, • . . • ~ ' . • • ii ' ' I 
~ · "*. ~.~ J,µ,vi~w. o_Ct4e .. fact :t:bat ...th.~ .. ;fe4~i.:~l ex~.is.e,.ta~ and 
the state sa;~~s fa}~ .attac:q &t..th~ .. histnp.t11Gl..s~le.i.s :m~de, ~t fol-
lows that the federal tax has not become a part of the sale 
price, but is a fund, which when collected is payable by the 
manufacturer to the federal g<;>,vernment. Such fund does not 
become a part of the 'gross proceeds' realized by the manu-
facturer from the sale, and is not subject to taxation within 
the meaning of Act No. 167~ Piib: Acts 1933. 
"We have had under consideration the sales tax laws and 
xegulat~ons of o~h~r States. I~ .s(,me ~~ates. such as Ut,ahJ 
the manufacturer or ,pro<;lucer of an article sold for. consump-
tion or use may ,deduct the federal .excise tax~ while in ·such 
States as North Dakota, I1lirioi~1 Colorado and South Dakota, 
such.exemptions are ma¢te by administrative uulings. !n Haig 
and Shoup, The Sales Tax in tlie ,Am~r~an States, p. -660; it 
is said: 'Exemption of the receipts of other state or Federal 
ta~es.. It i~ likely * .~. *.thati tax money aGtually- collected by 
the t~xpayer .a~ ~g·.ent. ~or the .stat.e, or federal. government 
will pe ge~~r&lly deducted :as .. mo.neys in .which. he has .no in· 
terest,. specifically proV:id~d .for in the. regulations, .of Indiana 
~:Qd .Sp;ut4. Daltofo ~nd i¥\plicit .in. the. other .statutes which 
purport generally to tax the principal arid not his agent.' 
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24* *"The conclusion is inevitable that the federal excise 
tax may not be conside1·ed as a part of the retail price, 
and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.'' 
A New York Appellate Court rendered a similar decision 
in Gulf Oil Corporation v. McGoldrick, 9 N. Y. s·. (2) 544. 
3. 
Double Taxation. 
The rule requiring construction of a doubtful tax statute 
so as to avoid double taxation is practically universal and is 
well stated in 51 Am. Jur. at page 340, as follows: 
''.Construction to Avoid Double Taxation; PresU'mptions.-
While, as has been pointed out, it is not every form of double 
taxation which will be considered invalid, the courts are gen-
erally agreed that double taxation in any form is not favored, 
but is to be avoided, and that the intention of the legislature 
tM:> impose it will not be presumed. Before a tax statute will 
be interpreted as providing for double taxation, the intention 
so to do must be shown by clear and unequivocal language 
which leaves no doubt as to the legislative intent." 
4. 
Discrimination. 
Here again we believe that the rule against discrimination 
between taxable subjects which properly belong to the same 
class is so well establiBhed and well known to this court that 
citation of extended authority is not necessary. As in the 
case· of double taxation, 51 Am. J ur. contains a good state-
ment of the rule at pages 238 and 239: 
25* *" Equality Within Class.-The general principle 
that classifications may be made in tax legislation is sub-
ject to the qualification that there must be equality and uni-
formity within each class. In other words, a tax statute must 
operate alike on all persons and property similarly situated 
or circumstanced, or of like kind, and there can be no dis-
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crimination between taxable subjects which properly belong 
to the same class. While different rates of taxation may be 
.applied to different taxable subjects, uniformity of taxation 
requires that all property or other taxable subjects of the 
same class be taxed by the same 'rate or measure. It has been 
variously said that a. tax must fall impartially on all per-
sons in similar circumstances; that the only rule of equality 
in respect to taxation is that the same means and methods 
shall be applied impartially to all constituents of each class, 
so that the law shall act equally and uniformly upon all per-
sons in similar circumstances; and that all taxes must be 
uniform upon the same class of subjects. Where, however, 
there are no' substantial grounds for the classification made 
in a tax statute, the fact that it applies to all persons of a 
,given class does not render it any the less obnoxious as an 
unjust discrimination.'' 
CONCLUSION. 
In conclusion, your petitioner respectfully submits that be-
·cause of the errors hereinbefore assigned and for the reasons 
.set forth above in this petition, your petitioner is entitled to 
have the aforesaid judgment of the Circnit Court of the City 
-0f Richmond reversed. ' 
Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a writ of error and 
.supersedeas may be awarded bringing said judgment before 
this court for review; that said judgment may be reversed; 
that in the event that this Honorable Court should reach the 
conclusion that said judgment wtts contrary to the law and 
evidence final judgment may be rendered in favor of your pe-
titioner; and your petitioner further prays that in the event 
that a writ of error should be awarded, your petitioner 
26* be granted leave to have this petition treated as *his 
opening brief upon the h(-mring of the cause on appeal, 
with the right however to file a supplemental brief should 
your petitioner conclude to do so. 
Counsel for the petitioner herein desire to state orally to 
the court their reas·ons for reviewing· the decision complained 
of, and further pray that a reasonable opportunity may be 
allowed them therefor. 
Petitioner avers that on the 8th day of February, 1946, a. 
true and correct copy of this petition was delivered to W.W. 
Martin, attorney of record for the plaintiff in this action, at 
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his law office, in the State Library Building in the City of 
Richmond, Virginia. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. & L. STRAUS BEVERAGE CORPORATION, 
By CHRISTIAN, BARTON, PARKER & BOYD, 
Counsel. 
I, Alex. W. Parker, whose address is 506 Mutual Building, 
Richmond, Virginia, and who am an attorney duly qualified 
to practice and practicing· before the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia, do hereby certify that in my opinion the 
judgment complained of in the foregoing petition ought to 
be reviewed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
for the reasons s~t forth in the foregoing petition and brief 
in support thereof. 
.ALEX. W. PARKER. 
Received February 8, 1946. 
M. B. WATTS, Clerk. 
March 5, 1946. Writ of error and supersedeas awarded by 
the Court. No additional bond required. 
M.B.W. 
Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, ex rel. Henry G. Gilmer, Comp-
troller, 
v. 
S. and L. Straus Beverage Corporation. 
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DESCRIPTIVE INDEX OF ORIGINAL EXHIBITS. 
EXHIBIT A-Copy of defendant's.application for wholesale. 
merchant's license for 1942. 
EXHIBIT B-Copy of defendant's application for wholesale 
merchant's license for 1943. 
EXHIBIT C-Invoice of manufacturer within Virginia for 
be'er purchased by defendant and · showing 
amount charged for beer as one item and the 
amount of the Virginia Excise Tax previ-
ously paid by the manufacturer as another 
item. 
EXHIBIT D--Invoice of manufacturer without Virginia for 
beer purchased by defendant and showing 
amount charged for beer as one item and the 
amount of the Virginia Excise Tax previ-
ously paid an another item. 
RECORD 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas before the Honorable Judge of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond, held for the said City at the Court-
room therefof, in the City Hall~ on the 29th day of October, 
1945. 
Be It Remembered, that heretofore, to-wit: In the Clerk's 
Office or the said Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, on 
the .10th day of June, 1943, came the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia, by counsel, and filed its Notice of Motion for J udgrnent 
against S. & L. Straus Beverag·e Corporation, which Notice 
· of Motion for Judgment is in the words and figures following, 
to-wit: 
24 
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Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
Circuit Court of Richmond City. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, ex. rel. Henry G. Gilmer, Comp-
troller, Plaintiff 
v. 
S. and L. Straus Beverage Corporation,, Defendant 
NOTICE OF MOTION .. 
To S. and L. Straus Beverage Corporation 
Rudolph Cheatwood, President 
1707 Summit Avenue, Richmond, Virginia. 
You are hereby notified that on the 30th day of June, 1943, 
at 10 o'clock A. :M:., or as soon thereafter as Co.unsel may be 
heard, the Commonwealth will move the Circuit Court of 
Richmond City for judgment against you for taxes regularly 
assessed and still unpaid, together with penalties and interest 
imposed by statute by reason of your failure to pay the said 
taxes at the time or times prescribed by la.w, as per tax bills 
attached hereto as a part hereof. The Commonwealth claims 
interest at the rate of 6% per annum. 
(Note Memo as to amount due) 
1942-43 License Tax 
Total as per bill .................................. $830. 72 
Penalty .................. ~ ..................... $ . 
Interest . . . . ..................................... $ 8.31 
Costs . . . . ........................................ $ 3.00 
Total amount due if paid before case is clor.keted .... $842.03 
Dated this 7th day ·of June, H)43. 
COMMON.WEALTH OF VIRGINIA, 
EX. REL. HENRY, G. GILMER, 
Comptroller 
/s/ M. E. NUCKOLS~ JR., p. q. 
Finance Building, Richmond, Virginia 
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Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
This day personally appeared before me a Notary 
page 3 } Public in and for the City aforesaid, Hugh Reid, 
who made oath before me that he is Chief of the 
D~linquent Tax Section of the · Office of the Compti:olle,r for 
the Commo·nwealth of Virginia, and as such has charge of 
the collection of the above described tax bill, and that to the 
best -of his knowledge and belief the amount of said claim is 
properly stated in the foregoing· notice and attached account; 
that such amount is justly due the Commonwealth from the 
defendant; that the several items of the said claim ~nd the 
aggregate amount thereof and the credits so far as the same 
exist are distinctly stated in said account and notice, and that 
· the amount claimed by the Commonwealth is correct, due· 
.and unpaid. 
My commission expires January 10, 1946. 
Given under my hand this 7th day of June, 1943. 
/s/ ALLENE Z. WILSON 
Note: Make check payable to vV. Tayloe Murphy, Treas-
urer of Virginia., and mail to the Delinquent Tax Section, 
Finance Building-, Richmond~ for dismissal of suit and of-
ficial receipt. 
Richmond City (ad) 
(Was commissioned as Allene Zachary) 
page 4 } (Statement attached to Notice of Motion) 
STATEMENT OF TAXES DUE BY: 
S. and L. Sraus Beverage Corporation 
1707 Summit Avenue 
Richmond, Virginia. 













Total amount due if paid before case is docketed $842.03 
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page 5 ~ (Affidavit attached to Notice of Motion) 
.A.FFID.A. VIT UNDER SOLDIERS .A.ND SAILOR.S CIVIL 
RELIEF ACT OF 1940, APPROVED OCTOBER 
17, 1940. 
Virginia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
Hugh Reid, Chief, Delinquent Tax Section, Department of 
Finance, Commonwealth of Virginia, being duly sworn on· 
oath, states that he is in charge of the collection of the ac-
count which is the subject of this suit and makes this affidavit 
on behalf of the plaintiff., Commonwealth of Virginia, and that 
•he is unable to determine whether the defendant is in military · 
service. · 
/s/ HUGH REID 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this Jun. 7, 1943. 
My commission will expire Jan. 10, 1946. 
/s/ ALLENE Z. WILSON 
Notary Public 
(Was Commissioned as Allene Zachary) 
page 6 ~ .And at another day to-wit: at a Circuit Court of 
1943. 
the City of Richmond held on the 30th day of June, 
This day came· the Plaintiff, by her Attorney, and on mo-
tion of the Plaintiff, by her Attorney, this Notice of Motion 
for Judgment is hereby docketed, and came also the Defend-
ant, by its Attorney, and by leave of court filed its Plea and 
Affidavit. 
/ 
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Virginia:. 
• 
( Filed June 30, 1943) 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
· -Commonwealth of Virginia, ex. rel. Henry G. Gilmer, Comp-
troller., Plain tiff 
v. 
S. and L. Straus Beverage Corporation, Defendant 
PLEA OF THE GENERAL ISSUE. 
The said defendant, by its attorneys, comes and says that 
it does not owe the sum of $842.03, in the notice of motion in 
this action demanded, in the manner and form as the plaintiff 
hath complained against it. And of this the said defendant 
puts itself upon the country. 
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Virginia: 
S. AND L. S~PR.A.US BEVERAGE 
CORPORATION 
By /s/ ALEX. ,v-. PARKER 
Counsel 
(Filed June 30, 1943) 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Commonwealth of-Virgfoia, ex. rel. Henry G. Gilmer, Comp-
. troller, Plain~i:ff 
v. 
S. and L. Straus Beverage Corporation, Defendant 
·AFFIDAVIT. 
State of Virg'inia, 
City of Richmond, to-wit: 
R. J. Cheatwood being upon oath duly sworn deposes and 
says: That he is a resident of the City of Richmond, Vir-
· ginia; that be is the President of the defendant., S. and L. 
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Straus Beverage Corporation; that he is the duly authorized 
agent of the defendant, S. and L. Straus Beverage Corpora-
tion; that to· the best of his knowledge and belief the plain-
tiff in the within action is not entitled to- recover · anything 
from the defendant on the claim set forth in the plaintiff's 
notice of motion for judgment; that this affidavit is made pur-
suant with the provisions of Section 6046 and Section 6133 
of the 1942 Code of Virginia and .Acts, if any, amendatory 
thereof; and further said affiant saith not. 
/s/ R. J. CHEATWOOD 
Subscribed ancl sworn to before me, Hazel M. Walther, a 
Notary Public in and for the City of Richmond, 
page 9 ~ State of Virginia, whose commission expires on the 
30th day of December, 1945, this 3oth day of June, 
1943. 
/s/ ALEX. W. PAR.KER 
/s/ HAZEL M. ,v ALTHER 
Notary Public 
Counsel for S. ·ancl L. Straus Beverage Corporation 
page 10 ~ And at another dav to-wit: at a Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond held on the 8th day of 
October, 1945. 
This day came the said plaintiff, by its attorney, pursuant 
to its notice of motion for judgment heretofore filed., and 
came also the said defendant, by its attorneys, in pursuance of · 
its plea to said notice of motion duly filed; and both parties 
having waived a jury, all issues of law and fact were sub-
mitted to the Court: · 
Whereupon, the Court having heard the facts as stipulated 
by the parties and the argument of counsel~ and having ma-
turely considered of its judgment upon the issues joined, doth 
ADJUDGE and ORDER that the said plaintiff do hav-e judg-
ment and recover of the said defendant the sum of $649.04 
with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent per annum 
from March 13, 1943, until paid. 
To which action of the Court the said defendant by counsel 
excepted on the ground that the judgment of the c·ourt was 
contrary to the law and the evidence; and the said defend-
ant having indicated its intention to apply to the Supreme 
S. & L. Straus Beverage Corp. v. Commonwealth 29 
Court of .Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error and super-
sedeas to the foregoing judgment, it is ·further ORDERED 
that execution upon said judgment be suspended for 90 days, 
provided that the said defendant shall first enter into bond 
with approved sureties before the Clerk of this Court in the 
penalty of $1,000.00, conditioned as required by law. 
page 11 ~ .And at another clay to-wit: at a Cirruit Court 
of the City of Richmond held on the 17th day of 
Octob9r, 1945. 
This day came the parties by their attorneys,: and· the dE!-
femfant moved the court to amend the order heretofore en• 
tered in this cause on October 8, 1945, so that the last para-
graph of said order providing for the suspension of execu-
tion and the g·iving of a bond pending an appeal shall be 
amended to read as follows : 
''To which action of the court the said defendant by counsel 
excepted on the ground that the judgment of the court was 
contrary to the law and the evidence; and the said defendant 
liaving indicated its intention t.o apply to the Supreme Court 
of .Appeals of Virginia for a writ of error and supersedeas 
to the foregoing judgment, it is further ORDERED that 
execution upon said judgment be suspended for ninety days, 
and thereafter until said petition for a writ of error is re-
fused, or if granted, until this cause is finally disposed of by 
the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia; provided, the 
said defendant shall first enter into a bond within fifteen 
days with approved sureties before the Clerk of tl1is Court 
in the penalty of $1,000, said bond containing all the condi-
tions prescribed in Section 6351 of the Code of Virginia.'' 
.And the Court having- considered said motion, the same is 
hereby granted, and said order permitted to be amended in 
the particular above indicated, whieh amendment is hereby 
accordingly made. 
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Virginia: 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Commonwealth of Virginia 
v. 
S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation 
30 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
STIPULATION OF FACTS. 
Counsel for the plaintiff., Commonwealth of Virginia, and 
for the defendant, S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation, here-
by stipulate and agree that following constitute the facts in 
this proceeding and are to be considered by the Court in lieu 
of the introduction of any evidence by either of the parties 
hereto: 
1. S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation, a Virginia cor-
poration, hereinafter called the defendant, is a wholesale 
merchant of wine and beer, with its place of business at 1107 
Summit Avenue, Richmond, Virginia. 
2. Def endan~ buys the beer which it sells from brewers . 
(hereinafter ref erred to as manufacturers) only, some of 
which manufacturers are located in Virginia and some with-
out Virginia. In reporting the amount of its purchases of 
beer for the years 1941 and 1942 for the purpose of securing 
its wholesale merchant's license for the vears 1942 and 1943 
pursuant to section 188 of the Tax Code "'of Virginia and sec-
tion 22(c) of Chapter 94 of the Acts of .Assembly of 1934, 
as amended by Acts 1940, p. 199, defendant did not include in 
such purchases the amount of the Virginia State excise tax 
on the beer which has been previously paid by the manufac-
turers from whom the beer was pure.based, which amount of 
excise tax was included in the remittances made bv defend-
ant to the manufacturers for the beer purchased 
page 13 ~ from such manufacturers. For the year 19fl the 
said excise tax paid by manufacturers in Virginia 
on the beer purchased by defendant amounted to $79:593.71, 
and said tax paid by manufacturers without Virginia on the 
beer purchased by defendant amounted to $114,634.29, a total 
$194,228.00. For the year J 942 the corresponding amounts 
were $124,439.53 and $180,590.47, a total of $305,030.00. Copies 
of defendant's applications for wholesale merchant's licenses 
for the years 1942 and 1943 are attached hereto and made a 
part hereof, identified as "Exhibit A" and '.'Exhibit B". 
3. The invoice of the manufacturer for the beer purchased 
by defendant shows the amount charg·ed for the beer as one 
item and the amount of the Virginia excise tax previously 
paid by the manufacturer as another item, and in making re-
mittances to the manufacturer in payment of such invoice the 
defendant includes both items in one check; defendant does 
not pay the tax shown on such invoices to the Commonwealth 
S. & L. Strn.us Beve1:age Corp. v. Commonwealth Sl 
of Virginia. Typical invoices of manufacturers within and 
without Virginia are attached hereto and made a part hereof, 
identified as "Exhibit C" and "Exhibit D". · 
4. A beer manufacturer from whom defendant purchases 
beer pays the State excise tax in the following manner: The 
beer manufacturer from time to time applies to the State Tax 
Commissioner for a tax release certificate covering the de-
sired number of Virginia tax-paid crowns of tho class or 
.classes needed, and accompanies such application by a certi-
fied check payable to the State Tax Commissioner for the 
amount of the Virginia excise tax the payment of which is 
evidenced bv such crowns. Such tax release certificate is 
executed by "'the State Tax Commissioner and is directed and 
transmitted to an authorized and bonded crown 
page 14 ~ manufacturer, wl10 is under contract with the Com-
monwealth through the State Tax Commissioner, 
and such c_rown manufacturer.: on the authority of such tax 
release certificate, ships or delivers the Virginia tax-paid 
crowns to the beer manufacturer who affixes · them to the 
bottles of beer before they are shipped to the purchaser in 
Virginia. A duplicate tax relem,e certificate is sent by the 
State Tax Commissioner to the beer manufacturer which 
serves as his receipt for the tax paid. The beer manufac-
turer pays to the crown manufacturer the commercial value 
of such crowns as distinguished from their tax value. 
5. On March 13, 1943, the State Department of Taxation in 
regular course of audit assessed defendant with additional 
wholesale merchant's license tax for the vears 1943 ancl 1942 
in the amounts of $396.54 and $252.50, re.spectively, these as-· 
sessments being based upon the amounts of State excise taxes 
.set out in the sccoud paragraph which the manufacturers had 
paid on the beer purchased by defendant during· the years 
1942 and 1941, which had not been hicluded by defendant in 
its purchases reported for the purpose of securing its whole 
sale merchant's licenses. 
6. Defendant does not pay any State excise· tax on beer 
directly to the Commonwealth of Virginia, such tax being 
paid as heretofore descrihed, except that to one of the manu-
facturers located without Virg;inia from whom it purchases 
beer, defendant replies Virginia tax paid crowns, which means 
that as to the beer purchased from this manufacturer defend-
ant does pay the tax direct to the State Tax Commissioner; 
defendant makes approxhp.atel;':-- two per cent of its purchases 
of beer from this manufacturer. 
32 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
7. It is agreed that the assessments described 
page 15 ~ herein and. covere~l by the notice of motion for 
· judgment were validly made ancl eorreetly com-
puted if under the law defendant should have included in its 
purchases for the purpose of wholesale merchants' license 
taxation the amount of excise tax paid by the manufacturers 
as hereinbef ore described. 
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Virginia: 
/s/ W; \V. MARTIN 
Counsel for ·Commonwealth of Virginia 
/s/ CHRISTIAN, BARTON, PARKER & 
BOYD 
Counsel for S. & L. Straus Beverage 
Corporation. 
(Filed October 29, 1945) 
In the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond. 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Plaintiff 
v. 
S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation, Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE. 
I., Julien Gunn, Judge of the Cir'cuit Court of the City of 
Richmond, Virginia, who presided over the trial in said 
Court, of an action entitled Commonwealth of Virginia v. 
S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation, and in which judgment 
was rendered on October 8, 1945, do c.ertify that the facts 
as stipulated by the parties with original ex..i,ibits, all as set 
forth in said stipulation of facts and filed with the papers in 
this cause, constitute a true and correct report of the evi-
dence which either party offered or introduced at said trial. 
I do further certify that all the original exhibits intro-
duced in evidence, as shown by the aforegoing stipulation of 
facts, have been initialed by me for the purpose of identifica-
tion and are as follows : 
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EXHIBIT A. 
Copy of defendants application fol' wholesale merchant's 
lic~nse for 1942. 
EXHIBIT B. 
Copy of defendant's application fo1· wholesale merchant's 
license for 1943: 
page 17} EXHIBIT C. 
Invoice of manufacturer ,vithin Virginia for beer purcliasecl 
by defendant and showing amount charged foi· beer as one 
item and -the amount of the Virginia Excise Tax previously 
paid by the manufacturer as another item. 
EXHIBIT D. 
Invoice of manufacturer without Virginia for beer pur-
chased by defendant and sbowing amount charged for beer 
as one item and tlie amount of tile Virginia Excise Tax previ-
ously paid as another item. · 
And all of said original exhjhits may properly be trans-
mitted to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia as part 
of the record in this cause in lieu of certified copies of said 
exhibits to said court. 
I do further certify tbat counsel for the Commonwealth of 
Virginia had reasonable notice in writing from counsel for 
S. & L. Straus Beverage Corporation of the time and place 
when the aforesaid ·stipulation of facts and exhibits were 
tendered to me on the 29 day ·of OP-tober, 1945, within less than 
60 days after the entry of the final judgment in the aforesaid 
action, and the said stipulation bf facts, together with all the 
exhibits and incidents mentioned therein, are hereby made a 
part of the record of this procc(\ding. · . 
Given under my hand this 29 day of October, 1945. 
/s/ JULIEN GUNN 
Judge. 
pag·e 18 ~ And uow at this time to-wit: at a Circuit Court 
of the Cifr of Richmond held on the 29th dav of 
October, 1945. · · 
3~ ~~pr~m~ Cqurt pf APn~al~ of Vjr~infa 
This day came the partfos by their attorneys and the de-
fendant tendered to the Court its certificate of exceptions, 
a114 qn t4~ req~est 9f tl:ie defendant fqp s&id certi~~a{e is 
signed and made a pa rt of the record in this c~~~-
page °19 ~ · I, v\Tillmr ,L Grjg~s, Clerk of the Circuit Court 
of the City of Richmond, do hereby certify that 
the f qr~goti~g is ~ true traµ~~riP.t of tµe r~~cn-cJ iµ tµe a~tion 
at law wherein Commonwealth of Virginia, Q; rel. f.[ep.ry <t~ 
Gilmer, Comptroller is plaintiff and S. and L. Straus· Bev-
erage Corporation is defel}.iJant, ~ith the exceptiqn of. the 
origfoal exhibits which have be.en certified by the Court mi.: 
der the prov~~iqns of s~~ticm qa~7 of th~ Cod~ pf VirgiJ!ia, 
a~ aip.euqed by Act~ of A~s~mPlY 9f l9;3S, mw:r 136., f':114 th~t 
the attorney ·fqr th~ Qon:mHmw¢~Hh o( Virginia 4a4 du~ nq~ 
tice of the intention qf tge defe~~~~11t t~ flPPlY fqr such trflll-~ 
script. · 
I further certify that the qefepd~mt, S. and L. Straus Bev-
erage Corporatiou, has executed a Suspending and 8'1.tper-
sedeas Bonc1 i~ ~ccqrc:Jan~e 1,:Hh tlw nrqvi~iqns of Se~tion 
635:f., a~ ame~qrd by t11e .A.~t~ of A.-~~eiµ,R}y qf 19M, · iµ t}l~ 
Penalty of One Thousa.nq :Qqtl~vs ($,l:OQO:PO)! 
Given under my hand tllis :21st <lAY of ~ qye!Tlber, +945~ 
Fee for Record $8.75. 
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